Waubonsee Community College

Consciousness revisited, materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye

eng

Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index

illustrations

index present

non fiction

Consciousness revisited

dictionariesbibliography

310962428

Michael Tye

Representation and mind

materialism without phenomenal concepts

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more

Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism