Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy

Resource Information

The work Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in Waubonsee Community College. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy

Statement of responsibility

Todd S. Sechser (University of Virginia), Matthew Fuhrmann (Texas A&M University)

Creator

• Sechser, Todd S

Contributor

• Fuhrmann, Matthew, 1980-

Author

• Fuhrmann, Matthew, 1980-
• Sechser, Todd S

Subject

• Nuclear warfare
• Diplomacy
• United States -- Foreign relations
• International relations
• Military policy

Language

eng

Summary

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive

Cataloging source

JCX

Dewey number

355.02/17

Illustrations

illustrations

Index

index present

LC call number

U264

LC item number

.S43 2017

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

bibliography