Coverart for item
The Resource Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye

Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye

Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts
Title
Consciousness revisited
Title remainder
materialism without phenomenal concepts
Statement of responsibility
Michael Tye
Creator
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more
Member of
Cataloging source
N$T
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Tye, Michael
Dewey number
126
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
B808.9
LC item number
.T943 2009eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Representation and mind
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Consciousness
  • Phenomenology
  • Materialism
  • PSYCHOLOGY
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • Consciousness
  • Materialism
  • Phenomenology
  • Filosofie van de geest
  • Bewustzijn
  • Materialisme
  • Fenomenologie
  • Materialismus
  • Bewusstsein
  • Phänomenologie
  • Empirie
  • Erfahrung
  • Physikalismus
  • Electronic books
Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye
Link
Instantiates
Publication
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism
Control code
ocn310962428
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262255172
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
Stock number
8993A19C-7AFB-4C61-943B-A6F8B37A9BC8
System control number
  • (Sirsi) o310962428
  • (OCoLC)310962428
Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye
Link
Publication
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism
Control code
ocn310962428
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262255172
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
Stock number
8993A19C-7AFB-4C61-943B-A6F8B37A9BC8
System control number
  • (Sirsi) o310962428
  • (OCoLC)310962428

Library Locations

    • Waubonsee: Sugar Grove Campus - Todd LibraryBorrow it
      Collins Hall 2nd Floor Waubonsee Community College Route 47 at Waubonsee Drive, Sugar Grove, IL, 60554-9454, US
      41.7974 -88.45785
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