Borrow it
Coverart for item
The Resource Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye

Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye

Creator
Summary
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages)
Note
"A Bradford book."
Contents
  • Introduction
  • Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks
  • Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation
  • The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness
  • Consciousness of things
  • Real-world puzzle cases
  • Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism?
  • Why consciousness cannot be physical
  • Why consciousness must be physical
  • Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points
  • Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts
  • Various accounts of phenomenal concepts
  • My earlier view on phenomenal concepts
  • Are there any phenomenal concepts?
  • Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions
  • Consequences for a priori physicalism
  • The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis
  • The singular (when filled) thesis
  • Kaplanianism
  • The multiple-contents thesis
  • The existential thesis revisited
  • Still more on existential contents
  • Conclusion
  • Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts
  • Nonconceptual content
  • Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties
  • Phenomenal character and representational content, part I
  • Phenomenal character and representational content, part II
  • Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it
  • Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow?
  • The explanatory gap
  • The hard problem
  • The possibility of zombies
  • Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses
  • The "no-see-um" view
  • Sperling and the refrigerator light
  • Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility
  • A further change-blindness experiment
  • Another brick in the wall
  • Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access
  • A Burgean thought experiment
  • Social externalism for phenomenal character?
  • A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility
  • How do I know that I am not a zombie?
  • Phenomenal externalism
Isbn
9780262255172
Link
Instance
Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts
Title
Consciousness revisited
Title remainder
materialism without phenomenal concepts
Statement of responsibility
Michael Tye
Creator
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more
Member of
Cataloging source
N$T
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Tye, Michael
Dewey number
126
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
B808.9
LC item number
.T943 2009eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Representation and mind
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Consciousness
  • Phenomenology
  • Materialism
  • PSYCHOLOGY
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • Consciousness
  • Materialism
  • Phenomenology
  • Filosofie van de geest
  • Bewustzijn
  • Materialisme
  • Fenomenologie
  • Materialismus
  • Bewusstsein
  • Phänomenologie
  • Empirie
  • Erfahrung
  • Physikalismus
  • Electronic books
Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye
Link
Instantiates
Publication
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism
Control code
ocn310962428
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262255172
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
Stock number
8993A19C-7AFB-4C61-943B-A6F8B37A9BC8
System control number
  • (Sirsi) o310962428
  • (OCoLC)310962428
Label
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts, Michael Tye
Link
Publication
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism
Control code
ocn310962428
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262255172
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
Stock number
8993A19C-7AFB-4C61-943B-A6F8B37A9BC8
System control number
  • (Sirsi) o310962428
  • (OCoLC)310962428

Subject

Genre

Member of

Library Locations

    • Waubonsee: Sugar Grove Campus - Todd LibraryBorrow it
      Collins Hall 2nd Floor Waubonsee Community College Route 47 at Waubonsee Drive, Sugar Grove, IL, 60554-9454, US
      41.7974 -88.45785

Library Links

Structured data from the Bibframe namespace is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License by Waubonsee Community College. Additional terms may apply to data associated with third party namespaces.
Processing Feedback ...